Ever thought that your town is "unbelievably safe" is due to the presence of all those police cars ? Stopping cars for what you consider petty violations and police harassment results in a very large number of arrests for warrants, drugs, dwi, and develops info for other investigations....a large part is driver's attitude......

 

I think it's unbelieveably safe because it's an area where the residents are hard working, middle class citizens. I believe it's safe in spite of the police, not because of it. Whenever I see the police with someone pulled over around here, it's usually a middle-aged woman in a new-ish Chevy Tahoe, or a middle-aged man in a new-ish Honda Accord, or employees driving a Ford F-450 landscaping truck. Not to say the type of vehicle can determine if you're up to no good (obviously it doesn't), but based on my experience the individuals they are interacting with never (just my opinion) seem like a threat to the safety of the town citizens. Meanwhile, when I drove through the only dangerous town nearby (as I stated in an earlier post--the town where the police have absolutely no visible presence whatsoever), and was nearly hit by an idiot on an ATV weaving through traffic, the police were nowhere to be found. Sure enough, just minutes later, I passed 2 patrol cars (from the same town as the ATV rider) sitting on the side of the main road, chatting...but of course this was on the main road which runs through the ultra-affluent end of the town. Funny how they weren't patrolling through the dangerous street in the town. I'm sure it just...slipped their mind. That, or arresting truly dangerous individuals doesn't pay bills, while handing out citation after citation to the hard working, middle class citizen who is not a threat to others (sorry--the person driving to work at 43 mph in a 35 zone is not my definition of a "threat" to the town) sure seems to increase the bottom line of the police department, thereby allowing the department to become even more bloated. Maybe instead of giving out citations to people for tint violations they should be arresting ATV drivers weaving through traffic. Crazy thought, I know!

 

[Deleted]

 

Moving there would only work if I never left the bad/dangerous area. If I had to drive anywhere outside that zone they would still ticket me.

 

Read the last sentence, then go get them windows tinted!

TITLE 75 Section 4524 (e)(1) of the Pennsylvania Common Statutes:

(1) No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle.

That is the law according to PA state!

these so called Table X are tech sheets which you refer to and they are for inspection stations as guidelines; not meant for law enforcement to fine people who passed inspection in pa then later to be ticketed at their discretion.

this tint as been on the car since i purchased it and for all i knew it was or is factory installed as it is not that dark can easily see into the window; clearly identify anything in the car not good for thieves looking to rob people.
here is the case copied in case the link doesnt work:




COM. v. BRUBAKER

5 A.3d 261 (2010)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania
v.
Benjamin J. BRUBAKER, Appellant.
No. 2012 MDA 2008

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.


Argued October 20, 2009.

Filed June 29, 2010.

Benjamin J. Brubaker , appellant, pro se.
Michele H. Sibert , Asst. Dist. Atty.,

for Com., appellee.
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J., FREEDBERG and

COLVILLE,* JJ.


OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.:
¶ 1 This is a pro se appeal from a judgment of sentence imposed upon appellant after he was convicted of violating a section of the Vehicle Code pertaining to sun screening of windows.
We reverse.
¶ 2 On March 28, 2008, shortly after 4:00 p.m., the vehicle appellant was driving was stopped by Officer Lane Pryor of the Camp Hill Borough Police Department in the vicinity of the Route 15-Route 581 interchange in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. Officer Pryor stopped the vehicle believing that the vehicle was being driven in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1), relating to after-market sun screening or window tinting. After stopping the vehicle, Officer Pryor concluded that appellant was indeed in violation of § 4524(e)(1) and issued a citation to appellant.
¶ 3 Appellant was adjudicated guilty of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1) in a summary hearing in Magisterial District Court on March 28, 2008 and took an appeal to the court of common pleas. After a de novo summary appeal trial held on October 21, 2008, appellant was again convicted of violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1).
Appellant subsequently filed the present, timely appeal in which he raises three issues for our review:
I. WHETHER THIS HONORABLE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE LOWER COURT BECAUSE 67 PA CODE 175.67(d)(4) IS NOT A REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e)(1) AND THE VEHICLE OPERATED BY THE DEFENDANT COMPLIED WITH 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e)(1) AND TESTIMONY OFFERED AT THE TRIAL?
II. WHETHER THIS HONORABLE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE LOWER COURT BECAUSE 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524(e)(1) CONFLICTS WITH 75 Pa.C.S. § 4527(B) AND
PA CODE 175.41(a)?
III. WHETHER THIS HONORABLE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE LOWER COURT BECAUSE THE ACT OF STOPPING THE VEHICLE [APPELLANT] WAS DRIVING[ 5 A.3d 263 ]CONSTITUTUED [sic] A VIOLATION OF [APPELLANT'S] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
Appellant's brief at 5.
¶ 4 In Issue I, appellant levels a sufficiency of the evidence challenge.
Prior to addressing this issue, we will recite our standard of review:
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. . . . Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223,
1228-1229 (Pa.Super.2005).
¶ 5 Appellant was convicted of violating

§ 4524(e)(1) of the Vehicle Code. That provision commands:
(e) Sun screening and other materials prohibited—
(1) No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sun screening device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side window of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1). With respect to the tinting on the windows of the vehicle appellant was driving, Officer Pryor testified:
A. Well, it was obvious looking at the vehicle that there was window tint on it.

You could—this isn't the darkest that I have ever tested. This is about a mid-range window tint, that you could see figures in the vehicle. You could see there was a driver.
Notes of testimony, 9/2/08 at 11. Later, under cross-examination, the following exchange took place:
Q. Is it true that at the District Court hearing you testified that you could see and view inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side windows, and side wings?
A. Yes. Similar to what I did today, meaning 4:20 in the afternoon, daylight conditions. I also indicated that during nighttime conditions the case may not be so, to view the inside of the vehicle . . . . The window tint that you had was of [sic] one of the lighter ones that I do— did come across or have come across.
However, during nighttime conditions seeing inside of the vehicle may not have been as advantageous as it was during 4:20 in the afternoon.
Id. at 20-21. Officer Pryor's testimony reveals that he was capable of seeing into appellant's vehicle even though sunscreening
[ 5 A.3d 264 ]material was present on the subject windows. Thus, upon its face, the terms
of § 4524(e)(1) were not met.
¶ 6 Despite the above testimony and the express language of the statute, much of the testimony offered against appellant related to a standard imposed by the Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") and purportedly referenced at 67 Pa.Code
§ 175,67 concerning the transmittance of light through the treated windows. That section of the Pa. Code provides:
A sunscreening device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the inside of the vehicle is prohibited, unless otherwise permitted by FMVSS No. 205, or a certificate of exemption has been issued in compliance with § 175.265 (relating to exemption provisions). See Table X for specific requirements for vehicles subject to this subchapter. Passenger car requirements relating to the rear window are delineated by vehicle model year in Table X.
67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4) (emphasis added). According to Officer Pryor and, more importantly, the trial court, "Table X, titled Acceptable Light Transmittance Levels for Vehicle Glazing, requires passenger cars to have a light transmittance level of 70 percent or greater." (Trial court opinion, 2/18/09 at 11.)
¶ 7 With the above backdrop, the trial court's summary of the process by which appellant was charged with violating § 4524 seems rational:To determine if the vehicle did in fact violate the Vehicle Code, Officer Pryor used a window tint and reflectivity meter to measure the percentage of light transmitted through the glass. According to Officer Pryor, the device used was calibrated upon its purchase in 1996, and was tested by him at the time of the traffic stop to ensure that the device was functioning properly. After he determined that the device was reliably measuring the light, Officer Pryor used it on Defendant's vehicle to test the level of light transmitted through the vehicle's tinted windows. He found that only 36.3 percent of light was passing through [appellant's] front passenger side window, which was much less than the
70 percent required by law. Thus, as a result of the low transmittal level of the windows on the vehicle operated by
[appellant], Officer Pryor issued
[appellant] a traffic citation for a
violation of section 4524(e)(1) of the
Vehicle Code.
Trial court opinion, 2/18/09 at 4-5.
¶ 8 Appellant argues that, as Officer
Pryor admitted that he could see into the vehicle, the explicit terms of § 4524(e)
(1) were not violated. Appellant also argues that the provisions in the Pa. Code have been incorrectly applied as a safety standard and constitute an unreasonable interpretation of § 4524(e)(1). We believe appellant is correct that the terms of § 4524(e)(1) have not been
met and, although our reasoning is not identical to appellant's, we believe
appellant is further correct in his general thesis that the terms of 67
Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4) cannot be utilized to sustain the conviction for § 4524(e)
(1).
¶ 9 The express terms of § 4524(e)(1) prohibit a person from driving a motor
vehicle which possesses sun screening material "which does not permit a person
to see or view the inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side
window of the vehicle." Despite Officer
Pryor's and the trial court's focus upon light meter readings, the language of the statute does not prohibit a person from driving a motor vehicle which possesses sun screening material that "reduces the transmittance of light to below 70%."
Just as importantly, the statute also does not
[ 5 A.3d 265 ]prohibit a person from driving a motor vehicle which possesses sun screening material that reduces the transmittance of light to below a standard to be
determined and published by PennDOT. Such incorporation of a PennDOT regulation or
standard by reference is precedented in the Vehicle Code. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Hull, 705 A.2d 911 (Pa.Super.1998), we considered a
violation of the motorcycle helmet law, which provided:
(a) Protective headgear.—Except as provided in subsection (d) [relating to three-wheeled motorcycles with an enclosed cab], no person shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle or a motor-driven cycle (other than a motorized pedalcycle) unless he is wearing protective headgear which complies with standards established by the department.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3525(a) (emphasis added).
¶ 10 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bailey, 947 A.2d 808 (Pa.Super.2008), we considered the provision in the Vehicle Code immediately preceding the one at issue here. That provision deals with exhaust systems, mufflers, and noise control and states, in relevant part:
(a) Compliance with established sound levels.—Every motor vehicle operated on a highway shall be constructed, equipped, maintained and operated so as not to exceed the sound level for the vehicle as prescribed in regulations promulgated by the department. The test procedures and instrumentation to be utilized shall also be established by regulation.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4523 (emphasis added). In Hull, with regard to the appellant's argument that PennDOT had failed to promulgate a list of approved helmets, we stated "[t]his provision does not make it a violation to wear a helmet that is not on the approved list promulgated by PennDOT, but rather for wearing a helmet that does not meet the standards established by PennDOT." Hull, 705 A.2d at 913 (emphasis in original). In our opinion, the key to that sentence is that the statutory provision made it a violation to fail to comply with the published PennDOT regulation/standard. No such provision can be found in § 4524(e).¶ 11 Given the lack of reference in § 4524 to 67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4), we cannot see how the provisions set forth in that section of the Pa. Code represent a standard that supplants the express language used in the statute. The trial court seemingly incorporates the language of 67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4) into § 4524
(e)(1) by citing to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107
(B)(2). (Trial court opinion, 2/18/09 at 10-11.) That section providesB) Other violations.—It is unlawful for any person to do any of the following:
* * *
(2) Operate, or cause or permit another person to operate, on any highway in this Commonwealth any vehicle or combination which is not equipped as required under this part or under department regulations or when the driver is in violation of department regulations or the vehicle or combination is otherwise in an unsafe condition or in violation of department regulations.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(B)(2). The simple retort to the trial court's thesis that the terms of 67 Pa.Code § 175.67(d)(4) are mandated by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4107(B)(2) is that appellant was not charged for violating § 4107(B)(2) but, rather, was charged with violating § 4524(e)(1), which does not contain either explicitly or by reference[ 5 A.3d 266 ]the 70% transmittance standard utilized to convict appellant. Cf. Commonwealth v. Noack, 737 A.2d 1236 (Pa.Super.1999) (Driver convicted of § 4107(B)(2) for failing to maintain appropriate log books while driving a commercial motor vehicle.
The state regulation violated was found at 67 Pa.Code § 229.343, which incorporates by reference 49 C.F.R. § 395.8.). In accord, Commonwealth v. Gosselin, 861 A.2d 996, 1001 (Pa.Super.2004) ("The citation in this case charges a violation of section 2307
(a), and it is that charge which
Appellant was on notice to defend against. The trial court's incorporation of 58 Pa.Code section 137.1(a) in its order charges a new offense.. . . Therefore, Appellant's conviction also must fail on this basis.").¶ 12 Given our analysis above, and Officer Pryor's testimony that he could see into the vehicle, we conclude that the evidence produced at appellant's trial was indeed insufficient to sustain the conviction for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1). Thus, we reverse appellant's judgment of sentence.1
¶ 13 Judgment of sentence reversed..
Jurisdiction relinquished.

 

That is awesome! Thank you. Having a precedent is huge because if you get pulled, you can submit it to the court to have a ticket dismissed.

 

In NC the legal limit is 45% and in SC it's 35%.

I do all of mine 45% so It's legal in both if I sell something.

\db2
Carolina

 

I just got carbon 20 on my back and sides, 5 on the brow, and 55 on the windshield. It really cuts the AZ heat. I've done this to all my cars and never got hassled for it, and I get pulled over quite a bit for being a jackass.